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I The Problem 
Amencan business manage四 workingwith modern technological 
systems make decisions m three田parateareas (I) hardware factors, 
(2) social teclmology, or human resources for production and marketing, 
and (3) human factors of the consumers. Typically, American business-
men give attention to the three areas in decreasing pnonty, but when 
血eyconduct international busmess, the relative unporiance of the 
pnonties changes. For this reason it is neces田 ryto look at the three 
areas more closely. 
(!) Hardware refers to decisions about material and mechanical aspects 
of production m a plant and of the product which wtll be marketed 
and used. 
(2) Social technology refers to the requirements for dedicated human 
resources担 theprocess of manufacture, distribut10n and marketing. 
Modern teclmology requires appropriate structures of the org四 iza-
tion, modes of production, styles of management, methods of train-
mg and of motivation, procedures of evaluat10n and inspection, and 
systems of distribution, marketing and maintenance. It is convenient 
to identi命 aproductivity interface between hardware and social 
teclmology. (Figure A) 
(3) Styles of life of a people are affected by the presence of social 
technology and by the products and Side effects of the hardware. 
Different kinds of productivity interfaces have different impacts on 
the style of life Changes in and preferences for styles of life interact 
with both the productivity inter白ceand with deep culture, a term 
we shall use to refer to the values 叩 dpatterns of thmking of a 
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FIGURE A 
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The basic thrust of American business since the post-colonial period 
has been toward the domestic market with the result由atthe busmess-
man usually takes for granted the dedicated relationship between hard-
ware and technology on the hoof (the productivity interface) and the 
reciprocal effects between technology and deep culture (the cultural in-
terface ).Within the American domestic market, the two interfaces may 
be neglected without harm, but in international business由emanager 
copes with a different deep culture, and he or she cannot afford to 
disregard the two interfaces by confining decision solely to the hardware 
area. Two reasons at least seem to contribute to the businessman’s 
neglect of human resources and cultural factors 
(!) The productivity interface has been stable and dedicated for at 
least 150 years in the United States. 
(2) American deep culture, the values and patterns of thinkmg, modern-
1zed before systems of technology were developed. The changes 
in American deep culture have left few traces in manuals and text-
books or m memory. 
A brief review of the development of physical and social technology 
in the Umted States should clarify吐iecultural problems met by Ameri-
can busmess in the international field. 
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I American Modemiiation 
When the colonists arrived in New England, they intended to replicate 
to their own advantage the田meclass struc加res叩 dsystem of pnvtleges 
and prerogatives existing担 Englandat血etime. But conditions血血e
New World doomed their intent. New England communities possessed 
abundant land to d1stnbute to vutually anyone who had need of 1t, ex-
tending greatly出estatus of free holders, which had existed for only a 
few in England, a country with scarcity of land and surplus of labor. 
Second, the top layer of the English aristocracy and of the church re-
mained in England. Few of their elitist members arrived in the New 
World to give direct10n h也epohtical, judicial and rehgious sectors m 
the colomes Thus the middle of American class struc加rewas exp叩 ded
by elimination of both the bottom and the top layers of the English 
classes. Al也oughNew England commumti田 includedrank as one of世田
cntena for distribut10n of land, m practice the essential equality of al 
settlers produced deliberate and rational land distribution with need serv-
mg as the crucial criterion Many positions in the poht1cal, judicial and 
relig10us sectors were filed by amateurs, while social services were pro-
vided by voluntary groups. The roles of “町nateurs”andof “voluntary 
groups”established a pattern m American culture, leading Americans to 
discard decis10ns based on clas struc加re,ideologies, economic出eories,
doctrmes of the church, and泊 theirplace to substitute practicality: 
ergo, if it works, it's good. The development of this approach, later 
described as pragiηatism, coincided with the emergence of another 
American quality, the tendency to search .for a simple act m the past, a 
land grant for mstance, that was responsible for印刷reevents This 
attitude launched the American tendency to use a single economic or 
technical cause泊 thepast to explam future events The American 
mind thus was early attracted to technical and economic factors which 
work to produce desired events 白血epresent and the future. By吐ie
1660’s the colonists in New England felt isolated in and alone wi血
America. The past years were harsh, but the ones m front were wide 
open. Americans learned to place confidence担 theirwork and pro-
ducts and to trust m the future. 
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Although land was abundant in New England, the quality of血e
soil was poor. Modernization began with the changes in血edeep culture 
of New Englanders that were brought about by abundance of land but 
poorness of soil Some colonists were attracted to lands in the West, 
while other farmers m Lynn, Massachusetts, began to specialize in the 
production of shoes by 1760. Those who remained on their farms were 
forced to struggle with the poor soil and the scarcity of labor. To sur-
vive，也eyconverted to scientific farming and used technology to im-
prove efficiency. (Pennsylv四 ianand Southern farmers lagged behind.) 
By 1850, the factory farm had made its appearance担 thenorthern 
United Stat田（Brown,1976) 
As American moved west，血eycut their roots with the old home 
sites m the same way由at血enew rmnugrants of the nmeteenth and 
twentieth centuries cut their bonds with the home countries The 
opemng of the West encouraged the development of transportation and 
communication People learned how to read and wnte and acqmred a 
taste for inventions, practical knowledge and technology. Their cultural 
values of mob山ty,self-reliance and equality committed them to social 
organizations, including business, that were private and based on im-
personal social relat10nships阻ther出回 onthe pnmary bonds of family, 
clan, religion or ideology -except for the South, to a degree目
The deep culture of Amencans provided the appropriate human back-
ground for the key development in modernization the Industnal 
Revolution. In 1785, Oliver Evans organized the first mass production 
line m a gram mill near Baltrmore (Larrabee, 1961), but the sigmficant 
event took place m Connecticut m 1799, when Eli Whitney and Simon 
North organized assembly lines in their gun factory and began mass 
production The innovation soon spread to也eproduction of clocks, 
textile machinery and steam engines In 1816, an American coined the 
term technology, and by 1830, the assembly line with interchangeable 
parts became known as the “American system”of manufacture. 
Development of the steamboat reveals characterishc qualities of 
American culture as they are recognized today. Soon after its invenhon, 
steamboats were imported from England for use on American wate阿 ays
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By the !830’s, technical problems of precision of parts had been solved, 
and American industry began to ma田 producesteamboats powered by 
high pressure en位1es,the most up-to date American construction was 
infenor to that of the English, but Americans had already accepted the 
turnover of steamboats about every日veyears, since世田町tof ste田n
navigation was makmg dally progress The concern for productivity阻 d
efficiency c田nebefore the Ci叫 War.The ma田 productionof clocks叩 d
watches helped to implement time thrift, clearly enunciated by Benjamin 
Franklm, m 1748, with his famous dictum，“Remember that TIME is 
Money." By 1850, pocket watches were widely distnbuted, and Ameri-
cans had used世田 mass-producedtime pieces to organize household 
tasks, cottage industries and the like more efficiently and to participate 
in actiVJties outside the home on tune. The use of time as a control 
measure in managing had begun. 
The reliance on labor-saving devices, on machinery built for a short 
life, and the fascination with inventions al characterized Americans in 
the pre-Civil War days. American innovations in industry and business 
were not at the cutting edge of new knowledge and methods from 
science. Instead, the orientation was toward the market and mass pro-
duction, as American development emphasized systems of orgamzat10n, 
transportation and storage. 
In the period up to 1850, the South had developed a society based on 
self-sufficient plantat10ns which supported an anstocracy Although the 
South was more modem曲anWestern Europe, the region lagged behind 
the North and West. During the 1850’s the conflict in world vision be-
tween the two reg10ns was politicized担tosimple, abstract and moral 
positions. The North stood for freedom, while the South aligned itself 
with tradition, loyalty and valor (The ambiguities and cro田currentsof 
American political hfe had been sunplified and abstracted once before 
during the days of the Revolutionary War, when the colonialists ralied 
under the banner of hberty.) As the years moved into the 1860’s, the 
American genius for compromises fa!led to resolve the conflict between 
North and South, and the country went to war Although preservation 
of the union and the abolition of slavery are usually田enas the m勾or
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sources of conflict, it seems clear that the Ci吋lWar also represents a 
conflict between societies at two different states of modernization. 
The rapid development of transportation and commumcation in the 
United States had made it increasingly difficult for世田 Sou吐lto con-
tinue the cultivation of its own peculiar way of life, to maintain its 
self-contained economy and stil live in harmony with the North. The 
conflict was settled by force in favor of the more modern North 
Revolutions throughout the world since the end of World War I 
resemble in some ways由eAmerican Civil War. All these conflicts 
were and are permeated by tensions between modermzing and tradi・
tional groups, defense of a way of life, and the search for cultural iden-
tity. American history supports the conclusion血atthe United States 
possesses the oldest technology in the world when we include the cul-
tural interface as a critical component of a technolog1cal system 
Modermzat10n of American deep culture was essentially complete by 
the 1820’s Productivity climbed slowly until around 1950, accelerated 
and peaked泊 1966,with阻teof growth declining since then. The 
ge凶usof Amencan modernization has been in managerial and organiza-
t10nal innovations until the period of the Second World War, if not unttl 
由epresent. 
Modernization began m America with cultural factors, but the quick 
and extraordinary implementations of hardware and innovat10ns in 
technology on白ehoof caught up with and surpa田edthe changes in deep 
culture. It IS for these reasons that we suggest that the American atten-
lion to hardware, and neglect of human factors, is bound up with the 
pattern of development of business面 theUnited States. Finally, the 
domestic onentation of the American businessman, m conjunction with 
吐ieother two reasons, help explam why Americans are relatively insensト
live. to the productivity and cultural interfaces when doing business 
abroad. Iran, perhaps, provides the purest example of Amencan blmd-
ness to cultural factors in doing business. 
ID The Case of Iran 
Ir白Lfor centuries the meeting ground for East and West, now se四国
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as Islam’s chief testing ground for modernization. The revolutionary 
groups that deposed the Shah in 1979 gave to出erevolu lion the dis tine-
tive cast of a return to Islam. In the West, American policy m誌ers
collected economic, technical and political informatrnn and ignored the 
cultural and social core of the revolutionary movement. American inter-
ests were compelled to rely on the Shah and his governmental apparatus 
to construct information and to control fast developing events But the 
monarch had allowed a decisive sclusm to emerge泊Iraruanbody pohtic, 
sepa阻tmg白egovernmg ehte from the governed, cutting off mformal 
channels of communication to血egovernment, and con田quentlysatsfシー
ing one of the essential predisposing conditions for a revolut10n. 
The roots of the revolution trace back to ancient history of Iran. 
Successfully conquered by Alexander, the Arabs, the Turks, Geng!世s
Khan and Tamerlane, the Iramans have turned military defeats into 
cultural victories, thereby retaining a cultural identtty. A Persian proverb 
says，“Defeat makes us invincible，＇’ illuminating血eIranian cultural 
character of double identity, developed m defense of the self against世田
Arab military victory. The individualized defense of cultural integrity 
agamst the ways of a new God, and of God＇’s prophet and book (Forbis, 
1981, 30), relied on duplicity, pretense, guile and other evasive qualities 
of character and of action. The double identity of Iranian character 
requires an ambiguous representatrnn of reahty perhaps helping explam 
that: 
There can be no proper understanding of what underlies modern Iran 
unless we recognize the significance of this triumph of legend over 
history, or art over reality, this preference for embellishment as 
against unvarnished fact, for ancient folk beliefs as against new 
fangled creeds. (Stevens, 1962) 
Even contemporary revolutiomsts act as 1f their acculturation as 
Iranians can be equated m its form expression with aesthetics and social 
justice. Justice enters the thinking of Iranians as a leading Sh1-1st con-
cept, while the arts and the crafts occupy a privileged pos1t10n in Iranian 
culture. In the period preceding the revolution, the poet and the author, 
not the editorial writer, led in the social criticism which gave form to血e
revolutionary forces. 
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The double identity of the Iranian character is foreshadowed by the 
Persian prophet, Zoroaster {b. 618 B.C. ?), who created the native faith 
which加 a前田da cosmic struggle between light and dark, and a deep 
dualism of good and evil. The same duality inheres in the character of 
men, so it is natural to expect virtue to decline and vice to replace it. 
When the Arabs conquered Persia in the seventh century AD., the creed 
of Zoroastnamsm survived as an oral tradit10n, mingh時間thIslam and 
directing Iranian rehg10us affiliation with the Shiah sect of Islam. From 
the stock of Iranian my血 andlegend, there persisted the theme of an 
unjust death and revenge for it, and from Zoroastrianism, the Shiah sect 
acquired its chief distinguishing feature, the belief m a messiah, a great 
“imam”who wtll some day appear and bring about the triumph of 
justi回 andgood. (Forbis, 1981, 13940) The double identity of the 
Iranian character, its parataXlc predispositions, was deeply affected by 
embracing a faith曲目 considersPersian history to be pagan and des-
picable. (Forbis, 1981, 89) 
The Shiah behef holds that religion and government should be idenl・ 
cal, and therefore the Shah’s secular monarchy was日legitimate.(Forbis, 
1981, 146) Furthennore, the nation’s true leader exists but in hiding. 
The concept of the Hidden Imam dates back to 874 A.D., when吐ie
twelfth leader of the Shiites, who disappeared as a boy of four or five, 
interrupted the line of succession from the Prophet Mohanuned through 
his cousin Hazrat Ah The disappearance of the successor was eventually 
developed into the mystical concept of the Hidden Imam, which is the 
force behmd faith m lran today and was the force behind the relig10us 
opposition to the Shah. (Forbis, 1981, 140) An important p回目dentto 
the revolution of 1979 was the messiamc movement of Babism, which 
began in 1844 and changed its character into an open soc10rehgious 
messiamc revolt led by Sayyed Ali Mohanuned, who claimed he was the 
“gate”to the Hidden Imam, and at times announced himself as由e
Hidden Imam. (Keddie, 1981, 49) Babism was cruelly repressed by 
1851. As a soc10religious messianic revolt, it resembles other me田iamc
movements which have occurred in other parts of the world which担
part can be understood as reactions to the m1tial impact of the mdust-
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riahzed West in the Third World. The effect is disrupl!ve on handicrafts, 
agnculture, trade and other aspects of the country. 
The Western influence m Iran severely encroached on the develop-
ment of a national economy. (Forbis, 1981, 49) Beginning with conces-
Sions granted to the Bntish in the 1850's to build an internatrnnal tele-
graph !me across Iran, the rulers of Iran established a pohcy of extensive 
concessions to Western nations which eventually formed a body of 
mternal opposition to the Shah The protest and revolut10nary groups 
combined in the unusual alliance of religious and radical elements. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, important segments of the ulama had 
helped to lead popular movements against a govermnent seen as com-
plaisant to the encroachments of foreign加perialists.(Keddie, 1981, 
33) In 1892, a baSic alliance ofbazaaris, ulama and modernist reformers 
produced a nationwide boycott on the sale and use of tobacco, forcing 
the govermnent to cancel the tobacco concessions to a British foreign 
company. (Keddie, 1981, 67) Thus the formation of revolutionary 
groups that brought down the Shah in 1979 trace their origins for at 
least one hundred years. The bazaaris and ulama often belonged to the 
回mefamilies in the early凶neteenthcentury, providing the base for 
formmg a compatible alliance. 
Protests and revolut10nary plans m Iran contmued durmg the closing 
decade of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth but 
were dampened by the presence of Russia to the north, who supported 
the Qajar Govermnent of the Shah. But in 1904 the influence of the 
foreign factor in the internal affairs in Iran took the unusual form of 
Japan’s providing a stnnulus to revolut10nary actions. The Iranians knew 
that the Russian gover血nentwould mte四eneagamst any effort to under-
mine or to overthrow the QaJar Government, but when Japan decisively 
defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Iranians took 
heart for their own revolutionary actions. They observed that the 
supposedly backward Japanese were the only Oriental power to have 
adopted a constitution, and they had defeated the dreaded RusSians, 
the only m句orEuropean power lacking a constitution. The id回 took
hold in Iran that a constitution IS a“secret of strength，” and this dis-
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covery spurred them on to overthrow therr own Qajar Government. In 
1905, Iran entered its own cons!Jtutional revolution, which came to an 
end in 1911, when Russian troops marched on Teheran. 
During World War I, Ir叩 sidedwith the Germans, and the war 
brought devastation to the country. Local landowners and tnbal chiefs 
reasserted their independence and rebuilt their power as central authority 
declined. Nat10nalist mfluences grew in the course of wartime uprisings 
and revolts, while the increase of regionalism and disunity depressed 
postwar social movements By 1925, Iran was a backward country in 
comparison with other countries in Asia 
Modernization began in Iran suddenly m 1925 when Reza Kh叩，
father of the Shah deposed in 1979, seized power and laid down the 
foundations for the modern state, av01dmg dependence on Western 
powers. World War I mtervened, and when Mohammed Reza took up 
the task of development in血e1950’s, he departed from吐iepohcy of 
h路島ther,courtmg dependence on Western powers, particularly出e
United States, in acquiring super-sophisticated and expensive weapons, 
developing showy pro1ects and buymg fancy consumer goods He at-
tempted to modernize Iran from the top down without altering exist加E
institutions, visibly producing strong public sentrrnents担 opposition.
The Shah’s efforts m modernizing relied primarily on material and social 
technology Plans for modernizing agnculture called for training and 
education The economic aspects of agriculture and of the countryside 
were neglected, while industnal growth was over-emphasized. Economic 
pressures placed on both peasants四dlaborers swelled the migration to 
由ecities, which reportedly reached over eight per cent of the popula-
llon per year in 1972-73. Along with the pea回ntsand laborers, nomads 
also were sacrificed when they were resettled担 agricultureor in urban 
slums by being deprived of their means of livelihood. (Keddie, 1981, 
168) The distribution of income caused gross mequal抗日samong groups 
creating a profound split between the middle and upper classes and the 
vast majority of the poor To neutral12e the opposit10n, the Shah at-
tempted to control communication and to coopt opposing individuals 
with offers of good jobs in the government (Keddie, 1981, 236-42), but 
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events were moving quickly. 
All the fatal signals of a revolution were present. Toward the end, the 
chaotic planning resulted in ships waiting m the Persian Gulf as much as 
150 days to unload their cargo at overloaded facilities at seaports. Power 
failures were frequent, and other services were miserable. Traffic conges-
tJons in Teheran were memorable. Demonstrations and protests担ー
creased, inspired by the implacable opposition of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
which provided a refreshing refuge for al wishing to fle from a nation 
ineluctably movmg to a breakdown. But the significance of al也ese
signals of a coming revolution were deeply buned m deep culture，面白e
mystical concept of the Hidden Imam, and in the long-standing forma-
tion of revolul!onary groups, combming religious, commercial阻dradi但1
elements. Finally，出erevolut10n origmated in the rebell10us ethos of也e
Sluites, reaching back to the antiquities of native beliefs, beyond吐E
grasp or the interest of the West, and even of the Shah’S governlng elite. 
The proposit10n that血eIranian revolution was generated within deep 
culture deserves support from other regions of the world and from other 
movements, smce the propo鎚tionis radical for the West and for Japan, 
committed as they are to the econornlc, political and technical features 
of modernization. 
N World-Wide Reactions 
The history of modermzation in出eUnlted States demonstrates the 
intimate link between human factors and deep culture. The tensions 
generated in the society undergoing modermzation sometunes precipitate 
attacks on and r句ectionof technological hardware. The best known 
historical example is probably the Luddites加 England,who rioted 
against the introduction of textile machines between 1811 and 1813. 
The Umted States to this day offers the example of the Amish, a peace-
ful religious people, who have developed closed commumties that resist 
adopting much of modern technology These two examples, however, 
conceal the major perceived threat of technology, which 1s not physical 
hardware as such but the human orgamzation that is necessary for its 
maintenance Such human techniques what I have called technology 
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on the hoof -can have profoundly disturbing釦1pactson the deep 
culture of a people. The United States was fortunate that its Anglo-
Saxon heritage predisposed it to absorb technology without the strains 
白athave occurred泊 othercountnes Scholars who have analyzed the 
modern personality have identified features that resemble closely the 
basic American character structure, and the same social scientists typi-
cally cite the United States as the best example of a modern society. 
The social histonan Richard D. Brown concludes that the modern per-
sonality was established in al of1ts essentials by the 1820’s inthe Umted 
States. Alexis de Tocqueville, the French aristocrat who visited the 
United States in 1831, described the American as the new man with al 
the features ofmodermty. Modermzation was uneven, however, with the 
Sou血 laggingbehind the North and the West. The competing world 
visions freedom and modernizat10n on the one side, and tradition, 
loyalty and valor on the other -polarized the nation and brougllt on 
the Civil War. (Brown, 1976) 
The crucial aspect of American modernization is血atthe deep culture 
of Americans modermzed before the introduct10n of mdustnal produc-
tion techniques. In other parts of the world, the reverse proce田 has
usually taken place. Smce the Second World War, economic plarmers and 
political leaders in the les developed countries have imported advanced 
technology from the West to stinmlate national economic and social 
development. The results have been disastrous when the deep culture of 
the country is out of jo担twith the social technology and style of life 
required by the rmported haldware technology As in Iran, the people 
fal back on tradit10nal ways to protect their collective identity, to re-
assert their cultural meaning and to salve their na!Ional pnde. This 
cultural recession takes different forms, but in al cases the purpose 
seems to be to establish traditional pr加ordialbonds that have been 
disrupted or threatened by the process of modermzat10n In Iran and 
througllout the Mideast, the re／，邸側 ofIslanl has been the m吋orreserve 
of primordial sentiments and bonds to which people have returned 
In Israel, Canada and Belgium, language symbohzes cultural unity and 
division. In South Africa and to a much lesser degree in the Umted 
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States, the cultural recess10n has used race to attain cultural meamng 
The American Indian and various groups in Africa and in India have 
tried to solidify their cultural identity within a region. In India and 
Indonesia, customs are carefully tended as a means of cultural identity 
Finally, ethnicity，皿血eUnited States, the Soviet Union and parts of 
the Mideast, Europe, Asia and Africa, has been used to restore tradi-
tional cultural identities. The cultural sentiments sought m religion, 
language, race, region, customs and ethnicity provide mternal bonds of 
solidarity that furnish the basis of political power目 Ideologiesare formed 
which help guide groups in血erpolitical and sometimes v10lent efforts 
to formulate and achieve their own economic and social objectives. 
In many parts of the world, both intellectuals and lay people believe 
that political and social change can come about only through revolution, 
a violent discontinuity in the life of political and social groups. It is 
prrrnanly担也eAnglo-S皿onworld that the belief m contmmty and 
evolution of political and social structures stil prevails But beginning 
with the French Revolution of 1789, the balance of political thought in 
the modern world accepts revolut10ns with血esame naturalness that 
Americans create a new committee, a new professional group, or a new 
government agency to carry out a positive program Most groups in other 
parts of the world are more likely to coalesce voluntarily in opposition to 
another grouping, often with the purpo田 ofattacking or destroying the 
target group. Voluntary groups are seldom expected to take positive 
actions, instead, itis血egovernment and political parties, shaped by 
their ideologies, which initiate social and economic changes The effort 
to politic包eAmerican society in the 1960’s, and make Americans more 
similar to the pohticized citizens of some other countnes, did not suc-
ceed in producing mass-based revolutionary zeal. Amencans did not flock 
to new parties or ideologies. Instead, the social and political p回目uresof 
the sixties raised the political influence of special interest groups and 
changed customs and social habits. In the same decade, in 1966, the rate 
of growth of productivity of the economy and the achievement of 
American students peaked. 
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V Style of Life 
Economic growth during the post-war period raised the aspirations of 
people throughout the world to a level which could not be met by出e
government planners and leaders The gar between the haves and血e
have nots widened and contributed to greater frustrat10n The wealth 
created by the new oil cartel has adversely influenced the developed 
nat10ns and created a paradoxical situation. Third world countries have 
attained a greater per capita iilcome than some of the developed coun-
tnes, but their new wealth has not damaged their status m the eyes of the 
poor countries of the developing world Indeed, the OPEC couritnes 
proved to the Third World由atdeveloping nations can effectively unite 
ag剖nstthe developed countries At least two countries, Libya and Iraq, 
have provided covert havens for the international underground move-
ment of terronsts. The Palestlnians, struggling for mternatrnnal standmg 
and for a homeland, have担stiledsome of the discipline and training 
demonstrated by terronsts. Such events present a confused world for 
the United States, which under Carter made human rights an ideological 
cornerstone of its foreign policy. Amencans long ago settled their own 
political and economic doubts and now have httle understanding of the 
五orcesunleashed by the tensions of political and economic development. 
In add1t10n, even within the boundaries of吐ieWest, the United States 
and Canada, Western Europe and Japan, a new factor has entered mto 
busines渇 operations.Special interest groups, the profess10ns and labor 
enioy political and economic success, in some cases having absorbed the 
lessons of the 1960’s. The demands of labor and of other groups, and 
even of some governments, are no longer enti問lyframed within the 
objectives of economic growth. Styles or quality of life has become an 
issue m negotiations. Japan has announced its commitment in the 1980’s 
to improve the quality of life. A study done by Battelle, Frankfurt, 
concludes that the major part of Gennan opposit10n to nuclear power 
denves from style of life and not from fear of nuclear power The West 
Germans generally believe that it is possible to produce nuclear power 
safely, but the surveillance measures requued would mfringe upon or 
threaten their democracy. Urban Germans appear to accept the presence 
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of nuclear power plants, but Germans in the rural areas have opposed血e
appropriation of land required for construction sites And, in the United 
States, U A W negotiators have introduced in negotiations with manage 
ment the demands for di伊1tyof the worker The implication of these 
developments 1s that busmess now deals more directly with issues of deep 
culture, even when supervis恒Eits own workers and managers Not only 
in the United States, but throughout the developed world, business 
decis10ns are affected by people who put quality of life before purely 
monetary gams. Meaningful work and worthwhile identity are crucial, 
although not at也esacrifice of pay and salaries. The odd result of the 
social and educational movements of the sixties is that由esocial in-
novators and government officers who admmister the social improvement 
pr吋ectsare well rewarded, whereas their pr句ectsaccomplish litle to 
improve the welfare of their clients The same group of social innovators 
and managers have adapted their rhetonc of human rights, which has 
penetrated both the domesllc scene and the foreign policy of the Umted 
States. 
The polar包ationof human rights and oppress10n trac田 backto the 
Civ日War Previous to that time, the freedom slogans applied only to 
white, adult, male, propertied Christians, but they were later extended to 
include black slaves, and m contemporary tunes, refer to Hispanics, 
Orientals and other groups m出esociety The ciVl nghts movement, 
however, condensed around the human nghts of blacks, who, as a group, 
have often been the focus of issues of justice for minor山es,equal op 
portunity in education, and cultural priorilles, thereby creating tensions 
in the society with other ethmc and racial groups Cultural strains are 
symbolized as human rights of race, religion, ethnicity, language, custom 
阻 drelig10n. The concerns in the society with these issues probably con-
tribute to the decline m the rate of growth of producllvity, functioning 
as a general background factor. 
It should be said that the concern with style of hfe and with ecologi 
cal quest10ns has spread m the developed world, as a result of affluence 
and economic success. But the spread is not world-wide, since techno-
logies and products which have been banned in the United States have 
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been exported to some third world countries which have embraced 
technology without heed for style of life or deep culture. The latest is 
China, which has turned aside warnings received from vISitmg American 
scientists about the threat to culture of embracing technology without 
considering its indirect effects. This suggests that United States busi-
ness cannot rely solely on the judgement of the Third World to prevent 
bu sine田 operationsfrom dismtegratmg under the political forces of 
groups advocating preservation of or return to traditional style of life 
and deep culture, sometimes by revolutionary means 
VI Consequences for Business 
The political and cultural tensions of the last twenty years have 
produced uncertam busmess pohc1es from the American government 
In the domestic scene, the government sometimes regulates, at times 
supports, and on occasion exploits business as an adversary. The result 
1s fuzzy guidelines for business to follow to prevent government interven-
lion or to direct this intervention to serve busmess interests. Abroad, 
there is the additional factor of cultural differences The climate for 
international business turns even more complex when political, social 
and cultural factors intrude more frequently now than in the past 
Some busmessmen have remarked that American supremacy m bus1-
ness was established by the lack of compet1t10n from other countries 
ra血erthan by superior American capability Whatever may have been血e
reasons for post-World War I American monopoly, this period is ended. 
The United States made up one half of the capitalist world economy in 
1945, but by 1980 the Amencan percentage has dropped to about one 
third, and al forecasts predict a contmued shrmking of the American 
share. Complicating the international picture is the fact that American 
alies m secunty and foreign affairs are the m句orcompetitors in busmess 
and commerce. The Umted States cannot expect its major alies to 
follow its uncertam foreign pohcy when they sunultaneously suffer 
economic losses, as with the economic sanctions against Ir阻， ormore 
recently Poland. The complexities of the modern business world may 
be summarized m part by the following points・ 
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(I) American industry has lost its overwhelming edge in busmess and 
can antJc1pate stif competit10n, particularly from the Japanese. 
ο） American rate of growth in productivity peaked in 1966 and has 
slackened since that time. 
(3) The quality of American products appears to have declined, with 
the Japanese showing better quality control than Amencans. 
(4) The a田umptionsundergirding American economy -of unlimited 
resources, cheap sources of energy and unlimited markets -must be 
revised to日tthe realities of the contemporary scene. 
(5) The condition of the economy cannot be entirely explained by any 
of the traditional four simple and technical explanations, wluch are 
the followmg: deficit spending by the federal government, growth 
of the money supply, excess demands for goods and services over-
heatmg血eeconomy, and wages nsmg faster than productivity. 
(Solow, I 980) 
(6) Americans persist in a self image of No. I, stil searching for great-
ness and leadership in a world that has reduced Amencan mfluence 
in business and diplomacy. 
(7) Social and cultural movements of the 1960’shave affected the work 
and management forces, particularly in government, changmg血e
work ethic to a Job ethic，担whichthe tight to benefits and careers 
is associated with job possession rather than with work performance. 
Even poor persons insist on a“decent”job. Similarly, among many 
employers, credentials have become more important relative to 
performance. 
(8) Rewards for job occupancy include intangible qualities defined as 
style of life曲目 faloutside measurements of担comeor. of GNP. 
(9) American expectations of increasing GNP, progr白sand quality of 
hfe must adjust to the concept of cycles m which the economy and 
its vital measurements undevelop rather than develop, as m New 
York City, and abroad, in Uruguay and Argentina 
(10) All of the above factors can be interpreted to correlate with changes 
in the cultural and productivity mterfaces in American busmess. 
In mternational busmess, the m司orfactors working against techno-
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logy can be identified as strams in the cultural interface. Natural 
developments and improvements of social technology have separated 
managers and theu employees目 Remote,abstract and analytical 
social technology in styles of management have made managmg an 
arid art remote from the realities of quality control, production and 
market. A reasonably distant future has shrunk nearer to the present 
to serve the obsession of short term profits and gains Managing 
approaches are out of touch with the values, patterns of白血king
and styles of life of many employees. Finally, management has 
failed to accommodate to the changing values of its employees. 
VII Response from Americ叩 InternationalBusiness 
The recommendat10ns to be drawn from the preceding目ctionsare 
general but st即位.tfo開 ard
(1) Introduce concepts of culture into planning proce田es.
(2) Redesign hardware systems and technology on the hoof so that the 
productivity interface will be more efficient in a given culture. 
(Japanese technology on the hoof proVIdes ample examples of alter-
nal!ves which American business could adopt at certam sites where 
the change would be likely to叩 ntnbuteto greater efficiency) 
(3) Use analytical concepts of culture and society in order to focus on 
the effects on hfe style and deep culture of hardware systems, 
particular防newproducts Use similar co悶 ptsto better understand 
and anticipate consequences of technology on the hoof. Redesign 
social technology and products to improve the cultural mterface. 
( 4)Introduce “mtercultural managmg”as a separate set of skils along-
side conventional managing 
(5) Develop criteria for evaluating intercultural managmg and mtroduce 
the category泊toa system for evaluating managers Double or 
triple the period of tune covered by an e四luation.
(6) Develop programs of trainmg, education and instruct10n from 
existing content, using method and materials in intercultural com-
munication to carry out po担ts(l) through (5). 
These recommendations stand for a changed orientat10n in business, 
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movmg away from reliance solely on hardware or social technology. 
Planning and management become more complex with the addition of 
a cultural dimension, but perhaps the complexity itself will provide 
opportunities concealed by attitudes of the supremacy of American 
technology. The dimension of culture represents a response to actual 
developments m the business climate of recent years. In view of the 
problems hampering American technology, and the competition from 
other nations, American busmess needs every advantage it can get. 
Redesignmg the productivity and cultural mterfaces will not give Ameri-
can technology a new cutt担Esurface, but it might give the old surface 
the new edge that it needs. 
(October 30, 1982) 
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アメリカ的手法と深層文化
〈要約〉
エドワード C. P.スチュアート
' シャル・テクノロジ
アメリカの経営者は，民的手法を重視して決定を下す。この手法は，
作業過程や組織内の人的配置に工夫をこらすことlミより生産活動の能率
を最大化しようとするものであるが，同時に人的・文化的要因の影響を
最小化するものでもあり，それ故に海外のアメリカ人経営者は異質な社
会や状況における適応力を欠くことになる。アメリカ的手法が柔軟性を
欠く主たる理由は，近代化を達成する以前の段階で，すでに1820年頃に
は文化的変容が成し遂げられていたという歴史的事実にあるが，このこ
とはアメリカ人にはあまり認識されていない。このような，文化と民的
手法との聞の関係に対する盲点、の故に，文化的・社会的体制を変えるこ
となく近代化を達成しようと試みたところに問題を見出したイラン革命
ルー ツ
の文化的原因を見落としてしまうこととなった。似たような方法による
近代化が，言語・宗教・道徳・習俗や伝説等の伝統的結束に立ち帰ろう
とすることにより試みられた。イランの宗教への回帰は， 1970年代後半
に革命の徴候が明確になってからもアメリカ人によって無視され，それ
故民的手法に固執し文化的要因を無視することから，アメリカ人経営者
は他の地域同様大きな損失を被ることとなった。経営者による企画政策
決定過程において，文化的情報を十分考慮に入れることが，将来強〈要
請されているのである。
